Waiting for 2016: How Much Like That Failed Hot Start Are the 2026 Vikings?

The 2026 Vikings have four wins, zero losses and a pessimistic fanbase.

This isn’t spoiled-fan behavior — when have Vikings fans ever been spoiled? — but mere pattern recognition.

The 2016 Minnesota Vikings had five wins, zero losses and a cautiously hopeful fanbase.

Now, ten years later, the 2016 Vikings have been compressed into a cautionary tale; you can start 5-0 and still miss the playoffs!

But more than a cautionary tale about hot starts, it’s a lesson in something Vikings fans have heard too much about in the last five years: sustainability. Our interpretation of the 2016 experience should be about repeatability and the risks of low offensive production.

That 2016 offense was tepid; they ranked 24th in points per game, and even that was boosted by the defense; they had the fourth-shortest starting field position on scoring drives of NFL teams that season.

In the first game of the season, the Vikings started quarterback Shaun Hill. They had traded for Sam Bradford just a week prior in response to a season-ending injury to Teddy Bridgewater during a team practice. Bradford wasn’t ready quite yet, so Hill led an offense to four field goals.

The Vikings scored two touchdowns in that game, though — Eric Kendricks returned a pick-six for 77 yards, and Danielle Hunter scored on a 24-yard fumble return.

The offense would not outscore the defense and special teams in touchdowns until Week 4, when a throw to Kyle Rudolph brought the tally to 4-3 (four touchdowns for the offense, three for the other two units).

The conversation around that team was largely optimistic — why can’t the defense be the engine behind scoring?

The story is well-told at this point. The Vikings lost the next four games and finished 8-8, missing the playoffs. The defense was very good that year, ranking sixth in points per game allowed and second in EPA per play given up.

The offense, through five weeks, only mustered 18.2 points per game. There was reason for concern, especially after having moved heaven and earth (one first-round pick and a conditional fourth) for Bradford.

Shortly after offensive coordinator Norv Turner announced his resignation, I was visiting my then-girlfriend’s parents and her father asked me why “they would fire” Norv Turner after an undefeated start and just two more losses. After explaining that — technically — he resigned, I also tried to point out that the offense was bad. They might be 5-2, but they weren’t winning in a way that inspired confidence in their ability to keep winning going forward.

It didn’t land. He didn’t like it. Why mess with a good thing?

The concerns about the 2016 offense didn’t go away with Turner’s departure, however. Somehow, they got worse at scoring after that, managing just 16.2 offensive points per game in the weeks that followed, all the way to the end of the season.

The Vikings led the league in non-offensive scoring while dribbling along the bottom of the ranks in scrimmage points scored by the offense. Pat Shurmur, understanding that he couldn’t design an offense for Sam Bradford and a beleaguered offensive line that featured deep shots, sped up the time to throw and shortened the throwing depth.

It was the correct decision, but it wasn’t enough. An offense with a stellar receiving corps couldn’t see targets downfield or put points up on the board. And so, they missed the playoffs.

One could abstractly argue that the 2016 Vikings are also a reason for optimism. The 2017 season was one of the most exciting seasons in Vikings history, which is a difficult bar to meet. That was characterized by one of the better defenses of the decade but also high-volatility passing that took better advantage of the receiving corps.

While finding a backup as talented as Case Keenum is pretty unlikely, it remains the case that the Vikings entered the season having replaced neither their starting quarterback (on purpose, anyway) nor their offensive coordinator.

The 2017 season was itself unsustainable, of course, which is what motivated the Vikings to let Keenum walk in free agency in favor of Kirk Cousins. So perhaps we shouldn’t put too much stock in something like that.

Their 15-10 win against the Miami Dolphins forces the comparison.

Despite an all-world performance from the special teams unit, the Vikings immediately gifted the Dolphins defense their first forced first-half punt of the season courtesy of their first sack of the season.

There’s something a little dispiriting about seeing the Vikings offense struggle as the commentators cannot stop talking about the Dolphins like they are a prodigious child still learning how to read.

Kevin Kugler: “This Dolphins defense, we saw it on this opening drive, the signs of improvement are there for this young group.”

Daryl Johnston: “They’ve taken strides. We’ve talked about small victories. The run defense has gotten better from week to week. They’ve gotten a little bit of pressure on the quarterback, but they hadn’t gotten that sack until today on that opening play. So, strides that are there, but still a long way to go for this group.”

The commentators weren’t wrong to talk about the Dolphins like this. In addition to being the youngest team in the NFL, they entered the game ranked 30th in EPA per play allowed and 32nd in points per drive allowed.

The sack absence was not an extreme statistical quirk; the Dolphins entered the game dead last in pressure rate. They are, by all accounts, a truly abysmal defense.

If the 2016 Vikings were a mediocre offense, the 2026 offense is putrid. Over the last three games, they’ve scored one offensive touchdown, supplementing that with 11 field goals and a special teams score.

It’s not as if the offense is doing a lot of work to help set up these field goals, either. When evaluating field goals by likelihood (as a function of distance), we can see how many field goals an average team would score from the kicking distance Reichard has had to work with. That number is 9.9 over the season. That means Reichard has made 2.1 kicks over that.

When accounting for the lost expected point value of field position due to misses, Reichard ranks second in the league in field goal points over expected with +7.13, just behind the Colts’ Spencer Shrader’s +8.99.

The Vikings offense has benefited from the seventh-best average starting field position, but their touchdown rate on drives (14.3 percent) is the third-worst in the league. On the other hand, they rank first in percentage of drives ending in a field goal (28.6 percent).

They don’t get in the red zone, either. Despite that seventh-best starting field position, they have a drive enter the red zone just 19.0 percent of the time — second-worst in the league, just ahead of the Falcons.

Because they avoid turnovers (something they share with the 2016 team), they end up in an unusual position. They lead the league in drives ending in a kick.

For a team that has playoff aspirations, anything less than vorpally slicing through the Dolphins defense is capitulation. It might feel unfair to place playoff aspirations on them when they were generally projected to finish last in the division, but it’s the direct remit from the ownership — every year has playoff expectations, which informs their roster-building decisions.

If the team did not expect to compete, they would not have signed Kyler Murray or invested in aged veterans like Jamal Adams, Harrison Smith, Brian O’Neill or Aaron Jones.

A few weeks ago, viewers were treated to a graphic pointing out that Kevin O’Connell is the only coach in history to win four consecutive games with four different starting quarterbacks.

There is something truly skilled in being able to pilot that kind of ship, even with the benefit of a historically great defensive coordinator but it’s also the case that the offense, with the situation mostly ideal, can’t score. And he’s an offensive head coach with offensive playcalling duties, and his quarterback expertise is so well-regarded that he directly influences quarterback decision-making.

It is reasonable to take credit away from O’Connell when it comes to defensive performance and lay heavier blame for what happens on offense. While O’Connell deserves credit for jettisoning former defensive coordinator Ed Donatell after his first year as head coach to bring in Brian Flores, there’s only so much credit one can give management for identifying talent.

The four-win performance to start the season doesn’t tell us that the Vikings are a good team. It buys them time to get there without risking playoff position, which isn’t the worst thing in the world.

The gap is enormous, however. The difference in the Vikings’ offensive and defensive performance over four games is the 17th-largest difference in points per drive through four games out of the 457 team-seasons we have data for going back to 1999. Finishing in the fourth percentile of all teams in terms of how drastically different the units perform is a problem.

If they want to avoid another historic late-season collapse, they need to fix this offense.

Touchdown rate is admittedly a volatile measure, and it runs downstream of an extremely volatile measure, red zone conversion rate. Generally speaking, touchdown rate inside the red zone means virtually nothing compared to the ability to consistently enter the red zone.

But as mentioned above, the Vikings have an abysmal red zone entry rate.

There are some statistical signs of life; the Vikings offense performs better in EPA/play than in points scored and does slightly better when accounting for opponent, despite how weak the Dolphins have been. This suggests that the Vikings can move the ball but stall out before hitting the red zone.

We also know the offense has been missing its biggest star for long stretches. The Vikings expect Justin Jefferson back soon.

This isn’t unmitigated confidence, however. The injuries to Donovan Jackson (season-ending, per latest reporting) and Christian Darrisaw could crater any incremental gains made from operational improvements and could undercut what Jefferson brings to the offense.

And that’s nothing to say of the fact that the offense has been smoother with Wentz in than Murray. Neither has performed well, but when Murray has been on the field, the offense has run at -0.15 EPA per play, while Wentz has overseen an offense generating a near-NFL-average -0.01 EPA per play.

Opponent adjustments widen the gap; the Murray-led offense has performed as if it was operating at -0.28 EPA per play against an average defense, while the Wentz offense operates with just a minor decrease to -0.03 EPA per play.

Much of this is in big negative plays; the Vikings offense has had more turnovers and taken more sacks with Murray on the field. The success rates between the two quarterbacks are virtually identical and don’t change much with opponent adjustment. Success rate may signal more than raw EPA, so we could see stability here, especially as we dig deeper into why failures might have happened.

Given the results of the last several seasons, I think it’s fairer to assume that Murray will improve and has a higher ceiling than Wentz. But the fact that Wentz has performed better than Murray thus far shouldn’t be ignored.

Whatever the ultimate solution is here, the Vikings need to maximize it. All of these charts and words say one thing: if they don’t fix it, it’s not going to fucking happen.

Let’s talk about the game.

The early game was a disaster for Minnesota. Earning just 5.89 yards per attempt, Murray took three sacks, dropping net passing yardage from 112 to 89 and to 4.05 per dropback.

Pressure played a partial role; a high pressure rate of 40.9 percent can be difficult to overcome. It won’t be if the player passes for under a 60 percent completion rate on an average depth of target of 4.8 yards downfield.

The biggest culprit was Joe Huber, who replaced Donovan Jackson after Jackson was injured early. Huber took on quick pressures, and though he himself didn’t lose a specific rusher to create a sack, his inattention forced Murray off his spot and into other rushers.

Another culprit was the playcalling; the Vikings kept countering the Miami pass-rush — which rarely sent more than four rushers — by keeping extra players in to block. This seemed to be a response to early pressure, but it made the problem worse, not better.

With eligible pass-catchers stuck to the formation, Murray didn’t have outlets to throw to very often when pressure arrived. This might be OK if the players kept in pass protection could block, but T.J. Hockenson struggled as a pass protector. So did Max Bredeson, Deejay Dallas and Aaron Jones.

Because a burden had been placed on those receivers to get open at a higher frequency than they typically do, but they couldn’t manage it. Some of it was playcalling — the wrong play for the coverage the defense called —, but some of it was on the receiving unit, especially Jordan Addison.

None of this means Murray is free from sin. He was inaccurate on the throws he attempted and missed opportunities for matchups when they did appear, keeping his eyes locked on the primary progression in the play instead of alerting to one-on-one matchups and big-play opportunities.

All of this set up a much more manageable second half, where the Vikings moved the ball better. The touchdown rate element is complicated by the fact that the Vikings schemed up and threw a touchdown-worthy pass, completed to the intended receiver on the last non-kneeldown play.

In the second half, Murray completed 16 of 18 passes for 135 yards, 7.5 yards per attempt. He took one sack for 11 yards, for an adjusted net of 6.53 yards per dropback. His depth of target didn’t change, but that’s much less of an issue with a very high completion rate.

That was despite a higher pressure rate — an artifact of some uncharacteristic Brian O’Neill mistakes and another offensive line injury, with Darrisaw out for multiple drives after two separate neck or head injuries in the game. Ryan Van Demark replaced him

Van Demark held on; he didn’t perform outstandingly well but did better than most backups.

Either way, the offensive design and Murray succeeded in the second half in ways they couldn’t in the first. The completions weren’t quick — Murray went through his progressions before hitting checkdowns — but they were appropriate responses to pressure and a lack of deep threats.

This methodical sort of approach is what the offense needs; while the Vikings under O’Connell have traditionally been big-game hunters, looking for deep shots downfield and holding on to the ball, it’s always been the case that the more successful versions of the offense have deployed an outlet when the deep pass isn’t available.

T.J. Hockenson excelled as both a primary receiving threat and an outlet option. Hockenson not only found space and made himself available as a receiver, but won four of his four contested targets and reminded Vikings fans of the player they traded for years ago.

Murray looked better at the end of the game than he had in any other half he’s had with the Vikings and better than Wentz looked in any of his outings. Hopefully, that continues.

Historically, the offenses that improved most dramatically after a difficult start have done so because of a quarterback change. The three offenses that finished their seasons with above-average in EPA per play all changed QBs — Vinny Testaverde to Chad Pennington, Jake Browning to Joe Burrow, and Gus Frerotte/Akili Smith to Jon Kitna.

The two other major improvements came from offenses that switched from Josh Rosen to Ryan Fitzpatrick in 2019 for the Miami Dolphins and from Jeff George to Tony Banks in 2001 for the Washington Commanders.

Notably, the 2019 Dolphins started with Fitzpatrick, benched him for Rosen, then reinstated Fitzpatrick. That may not be the best example.

Either way, this has traditionally been the path to get out of the dirt for bad offenses. The Vikings probably won’t do it and likely won’t see much benefit from switching, but this emphasizes the importance of quarterback choice in this process.

The defense was astounding and remains so after accounting for opponent strength. While a team as bad as the Dolphins playing up to their “average” performance might be considered a below-average showing by the defense, the offense put them in a difficult position at times.

Miami went three-and-out on 44.4 percent of their drives and scored just 1.11 points per drive. The Vikings defense was once again saved from an explosive touchdown via penalty — which would affect volatile measures like points per drive. But in success rate, which discounts explosives and changes only slightly due to penalty luck, the Dolphins were held to just 35.1 percent.

To put into context how bad a 35.1 percent success rate is, it’s the success rate of the Vikings offense this year. This year, the two worst offenses in success rate are the Vikings and Dolphins. When you exclude those two, success rate ranges from 54.5 percent (San Francisco) to 37.3 percent (Philadelphia).

They did this through their passing-game effectiveness; they pressured Malik Willis on 60 percent of his dropbacks, blitzing him at an 80 percent rate. Willis posted a 4th-percentile EPA per dropback of -0.56. Accurate on just 52.9 percent of throws, Willis could not find consistency, and the explosives weren’t there, even after accounting for the one taken away.

Dallas Turner helped engineer this win, generating four pressures (per both PFF and Next Gen Stats) and leading the pressure leaderboard or tying for second, depending on the charting organization.

Turner did not benefit from as many reps against tight ends and air, having to work his way through offensive tackles in order to make his case as one of the better defenders in the NFL. Against an offensive lineman one-on-one on a standard dropback (excluding screens, boots, etc.), Turner managed a pass-rush win rate of 33.3 percent, an 88th percentile outcome consistent with high-level edge rusher play.

His overall pass-rush win rate — which still excludes unblocked reps — was 35.7 percent, a 99^th percentile outcome.

He needs to be more consistent as a tackler, and he was part of the reason that Ollie Gordon II’s stat line looks so obscene. The 9 rushes for 100 yards (11.1 YPC) were built on three explosives; essentially, when Gordon had a success, it was huge, but he did not grind out consistent gains.

Eric Wilson had an outstanding performance; he produced three stops and earned a pass-rush win on a blitz that helped enable a quarterback hit. He was effective in coverage and seemed to be everywhere. Andrew Van Ginkel and Kyle Van Noy supplemented that with strong edge play; they earned a combined five pressures, two tackles-for-loss, and three stops.

The stellar special teams performances help, too — the Vikings have the second-best starting field position following kickoffs and, as isolated above, have the second-best performance in field goal points added over replacement.

Their punting, inhibited by a two-week injury to Brett Thorson, is below league average. But their punt returns have been excellent. They’re the only team with a punt return touchdown thus far and rank first in punt return average. Add in one of just seven kick blocks in the NFL, and it’s clear the Vikings special teams unit is a difference-maker.

The Vikings are number one defensively in the NFL in EPA per play allowed, points per game allowed, points per drive allowed, touchdown rate allowed on drives, drive success rate (first downs and touchdowns per down series) allowed, third down conversion rate allowed, and virtually any other defensive statistic one wants to use.

We’re seeing a stellar defensive performance architected as one of the most interesting defenses in NFL history. It would be a shame to waste it.